The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs

Homayra Ziad
Jun 2003

Iran's domestic reforms and international policies

Bijan Khajehpour, chairman of the Atieh Bahar consulting company in Tehran, discussed Iran's domestic politics and its opinions on the Iraq war at an April 4 Woodrow Wilson Center program. He described the current political picture as a "temporary truce" between factions, the result of a state-society divide due to unfulfilled promises. This has been enforced by the recent lack of participation in local council elections.

The top leadership, including Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, President Mohammed Khatami, Parliamentary Speaker Mehdi Karrubi and Expediency Council chief Ali Rafsanjani, wish to move Iran toward a centrist policy based on the "Chinese model," Khajehpour explained, which gives priority to economic rationalization, easing social restrictions and allowing some opening in the cultural sphere, while postponing a political opening until a later time. Meanwhile, he noted, the president is also trying to get two crucial bills through parliament, one expanding presidential authority and the other limiting the authority of the Guardians Council. In Khajehpour's opinion, however, Khamenei is consolidating his power and increasingly directing policy.

The "temporary truce" as described by Khajehpour consists of a few points: apparent high-level agreement on Khatami's bills, the release of jailed former Interior Minister Abdallah Nouri and lifting the house arrest of dissident cleric Ayatollah Montazeri. In addition, there have been more active campaigns to ease domestic tension, including the gradual disappearance of the case of history professor Hashem Aghajari, who was convicted of blasphemy in Iran and whose sentencing prompted a wave of protest in the country.

Khajepour noted, however, that none of the parties are at ease with this coalition of the center. Hard-line conservatives feel this dilutes their power, and extreme reformers believe that democratic reforms are undermined by truces with conservatives. The challenge, said Khajehpour, is that, for the first time in Iran, there is no domestic hegemony in politics. "That," he said, "is why a real consensus needs to be built. Iran is not used to this."

Each political group has its own "tactics and tendencies" to improve the situation, Khajehpour explained. The centrist regime leadership is concentrating on improving the economy and the liberalization of cultural space. Film, publishing, theater and music are encouraged, targeting the expectations of the youth. Regime leaders are newly focusing on national security issues-something that had disappeared in the 1990s-and there is also an attempt to regain legitimacy through an anti-corruption campaign.

The reformists are developing a new image, Khajehpour continued, and reevaluating the composition of the reform camp-separating the "power thirsty" expoliticians from the 1980s who are seeking to re-enter the political sphere from those who truly wish to implement reform.
The conservatives are relieved after the last local council elections, he noted, because they now know that the reformists can lose. Their aim now is to make voter turnout as low as possible in upcoming elections.

Finally, Khajehpour said, the state technocracy has its own reform agenda, including self-evaluation to become more efficient.

The population of Iran, on the other hand, has become disillusioned with the slow pace of reforms, especially on the cultural front, as well as with what Khajehpour termed corrupt "rogue elements" within the regime, whose existence was admitted to by Khamenei. Newspapers less focused on politics are being read more than others, and youth are more involved in community and professional groups. There is continued high unemployment, and important ethnic and provincial demands. Khamenei, in fact, recently spent 13 days in the historically depressed areas of Sistan-Baluchistan to address regional problems.

Further navigating Iran's complicated political terrain, Khajehpour outlined the several varieties of conservatives in the country. The cultural conservatives, led by Ayatollah Khamenei, are uncompromising on the role of Islam and the clergy in politics, and very influenced by the perceptions of senior clergy and public opinion in the Muslim world. The economic right, led by Hashem Rafsanjani and key technocrats like Gholamhossein Karbaschi, are focused on economic reform. Khajehpour described them as pragmatic and opportunistic, interested in "gaining
domestic hegemony of power to safeguard economic interests."

The ideological conservatives, he continued, aim for absolute control of the state over all political, social and ideological affairs. They are determined to humiliate Khatami through the judiciary, he said, and are not afraid of challenging Khamenei. Finally, there are what Khajehpour called "shady interest groups," the target of the anti-corruption campaigns.

These major political factions are at a deadlock, he said, but no dominant political discourse or political leader has emerged. The paralysis could be ended, he suggested, by the Qom-based senior clergy-who have been out of the political scene since 1997-weighing in on behalf of one of the factions.

With regard to the war in Iraq, Khajeh-pour explained, Iranian analysts view it as the beginning of U.S. domination of the entire region. Tehran is concerned about the impact of Iraq's disintegration on Iran's ethnic groups and on Iran as the center of Shi'i religious institutions (fearing Qom's loss of importance against Najaf). The possibility of a Kurdistan is potentially troubling, as is the impact of an up-and-coming Iraqi oil sector on oil companies' willingness to do business with Iran. Equally worrisome is the possible emergence of Iraq as regional hegemon, and U.S. intentions regarding Iran.

In the post-war period, according to Khajehpour, Iran would like to see Iraqi Shi'i, including the followers of Ayatollah Hakim, play a larger role in post-Saddam Iraq, and Iran itself to be included in post-war discussions. Furthermore, it would also like Washington to treat the Iraq-based Mujahideen Khalq Organization (MKO) as a terrorist organization.

Tehran would also welcome a normalizing of relations with Washington, Khajehpour stressed. Because direct negotiations remain problematic, he suggested that Great Britain be an intermediary between the two countries. Iran has good relations with the UK and is expanding its relations with the EU.

Other possible foreign policy options to enable Iran to protect itself include: consolidating its regional position with Turkey, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia; deepening its relationship with the EU as a bulwark against the U.S.; or seeking a new strategic relationship with India. Important signposts to watch for, Khajehpour concluded, include the decision on Khatami's bills, continuing negotiations with the EU, emergence of a new political discourse around the concept of "national interest," the diversity of political groupings in 2004 parliamentary elections, and the consolidation of the "economic lobby" in politics.

© 2003 All Rights Reserved. Atieh Bahar Consulting.