By Paul Taylor

Khatami "may" reconcile Iran revolution with modernity -- Analysis

TEHRAN, June 10 (Reuters) - President Mohammad Khatami's huge re-election mandate may help Iran advance on the fraught path of reconciling Islamic revolutionary institutions with the modern, democratic state in the age of globalisation. For most of the 22 years since the overthrow of the Shah, Iran has lived a shuttered life with a permanent form of "dual power" built into its unique constitution, reflecting two different sources of authority -- the ballot box and the Koran. Since his surprise election in 1997, Khatami has tried "to achieve a genuine reconciliation between Islamic law, political pluralism and the multi-party system", according to Mohammad Sadeq Hosseini, a Culture Ministry adviser.

He has a long way to go. Khatami may have 21 million voters -- 77 percent of the electorate -- behind him, but the clerical old guard entrenched in key power positions still has the guns, ideologically motivated security forces and prisons.

Yet long-term social and economic factors such as the Internet, satellite television and mobile phones, growing links to the world economy and the exuberant, educated youth of Iranian society are on the side of change. Iranian thinkers across the political spectrum, with the exception of the far right, broadly agree on the need to adapt the country to globalisation while preserving Islamic culture.

They differ over whether normalisation requires changes in the 1979 Islamic Republic constitution, last amended after the death of revolutionary leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in 1989, or merely a more rigorous implementation of existing law.

SHADOW POWERS
Each state institution still has a revolutionary shadow. The supreme leader, an eminent Shi'ite Muslim religious authority, holds many of the powers vested in the president in other countries, such as control over the security forces, the judiciary and state broadcasting. The ideologically controlled Revolutionary Guards and Basij volunteers maintain national security and Islamic order alongside the regular armed forces and police. Revolutionary courts and extra-constitutional special courts for the clergy and press, which try suspects without a jury on charges such as "apostasy", "waging war on God" or "corruption on earth", run in parallel with the state legal system.

An unelected Guardian Council of clerics and Islamic jurists has the power to block laws passed by the elected parliament and veto election candidates on Islamic grounds. An appointed Expediency Council has the power to arbitrate between the two.

Revolutionary foundations answerable to the supreme leader control between 25 and 40 percent of the economy -- no one knows for sure -- defying government efforts to make economic activity more efficient and transparent.

Political parties, although now legal, are still in their infancy. Most are networks of notables or loose fronts rather than structured mass political organisations. The Islamic right has yet to form a party. The idea is alien to its culture.

Efforts to bring the parallel revolutionary institutions under state control or democratic accountability have been fraught with conflict and have advanced haltingly, if at all.

CHANGE CONSTITUTION?
Historians say Iran has a long tradition of dual power, dating back at least to the role of religious leaders in the 19th century in resisting foreign monopolies on tobacco and mineral resources. A senior official, who asked not to be identified, said the system worked better than its detractors maintain.

"This duality of power is not counterproductive. Maybe you have to look at it as checks and balances. It makes a coup d'etat impossible in Iran," he said. "It's not the task of Mr Khatami to resolve dualities. He should work within the system," the official said, reflecting the views of mainstream conservatives.

Among the president's reformist supporters, changing the constitution is not taboo, although they emphasise that much can be achieved by implementing existing laws fairly.

Some would like to see the supreme leader's role evolve over time into a sort of constitutional monarchy, giving religious legitimacy to the state without interfering in government.

"We can't say this constitution is unchangeable. We can't live outside the world," said Alireza Nouri, a surgeon and reformist member of parliament. Given the population explosion and people's growing sense of empowerment, Nouri said Iran faced "unpredictable events" if it did not adapt its economy and social system to the challenges of globalisation in the next decade. "We are facing a new world system that will impose its own laws and regulations. If we don't get to know and understand this new paradigm quickly, maybe we'll lose a golden opportunity to enter this new global system," he said.

GROUNDS FOR CONFUSION
Part of the problem lies in a bloated civil service that is having difficulty adapting to new government directives after 20 years of isolation, says business consultant Bijan Khajehpour.

"For two decades, they were told to apply regulations as strictly as possible to deter foreign involvement in Iran. Suddenly, they are told to welcome and facilitate foreign investment. No wonder they're confused," he said.

Political analysts say it is hard to predict when and how the dichotomy between the state and revolutionary institutions will be resolved, and the risk of a violent confrontation at some point cannot be ruled out. Nouri compared the task of bringing the Islamic revolution to a successful conclusion in a modern, democratic state to trying to land a jumbo jet. "Especially when the plane is coming in to land, we have to take it gently and reduce altitude gradually. Otherwise we risk crashing or blowing up the plane," he said. But if Iran did not adapt fast enough to a changed world, the global economy would pass it by.-"We hope we don't run out of runway," he said. "This is a very difficult exercise."